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A PROPOSED PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR LOWER-COST HOUSING 





For the past decade there has been an intense effort to formu­
late and implement housing practices and policies that would solve 
our housing problems. In fact, one might describe the period of 
the sixties as a frantic scramble to come up with one idea or com­
bination of ideas that would prove to be the cure. Major studies, 
sweeping legislation, dramatic goals came and went almost faster 
than they could be tried, until now we are left with a complex and 
chaotic housing policy that still cannot provide the quality and vari­
ety in shelter that we need.
The problem is of our own making of course; we in housing 
have misled ourselves. We have too often looked upon sub-standard 
housing as if that were the norm. In fact, the housing stock of the 
United States is of a very high standard. Often too, we have bleak­
ly appraised industry’s slipping capacity to produce—all through 
those mortgage lean years—offering our most inventive proposals 
to rationalize and increase production; but in 1971, with money 
available, conventional builders, seemingly at a moment’s notice, 
produced 2,048,200 units, (1) the best year on record.
Still, we know that many, amidst this tremendous affluence, 
are inadequately housed. But this stems from problems more 
subtle and difficult than replacing slums or frantically boosting 
production. It is perhaps more correctly described as the result 
of inadequate economic institutions and fragile social relations; 
that is, fundamental social and economic issues. Solutions effected 
in these issues can improve our housing, but it is difficult for im­
provements in our housing to effect solutions in these more basic 
issues. Still, it is vital that the housing industry wrestle with its 
side of the problem.
The thrust of this study is that the housing sector is integral 
to the alleviation of these fundamental problems, but that it must 
itself be healthy. The study will develop the case that lower cost 
housing is neither encouraged nor possible within the context of 
current housing practice, though there is a definite need. It indi­
cates that much of this has developed from the erroneous belief 
that higher priced housing would filter down to lower income users 
through the natural function of the market but that, in fact, this 
has largely failed and must fail as long as the housing market and 
housing practices are structured as they are. The study will indi­
cate that lower cost housing is possible through a redefinition of 
housing cost based on the life cycle costs of a unit rather than the 
present first cost practice.
CURRENT NATIONAL HOUSING PRACTICE AND ITS COSTS
The role of the public sector in current housing practice is 
two-fold: (1) facilitating the efficient operation of the private 
sector, and (2) subsidizing certain elements within the housing 
sector to correct for social inadequacies of the market. In prac­
tice this has led to the many state, local and federal programs and 
policies requirements and standards of which our housing stock is 
almost a direct reflection.
Although the present structure of housing practice is controlled 
and supported by government policy, it is not widely viewed as 
such. These policies: codes, zoning, monetary policy, minimum 
property standards, production subsidies, etc., are often consid­
ered individually as something apart from one another and other 
aspects of housing as well. It is important not only to recognize 
a particular policy, however, but the interdependence of all policies 
and their total impact on the housing sector. Not only does this 
attitude illuminate the complexities of the actual situation, but the
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inherent difficulties in effecting any major change as well. Some 
elements of this control, such as FHA minimum standards, are 
obvious; other factors, such as the influence of FHA and VA pol­
icies on inflation of land prices are less so, but stiU evident. A 
court decision supporting school desegregation through busing is 
generally not considered at all, though its implications to housing 
are potentially great.
There is some purpose for the existence of each of these pol­
icies and each imposes restraints on the housing sector, which in 
turn establishes in some part what housing wifi cost. There are 
so many of these restrictions, all with some purpose, that they 
have imposed a de facto price below which it is impossible to build 
housing. In theory, we could remove some of the restrictions, but 
which ones. All, to some degree, represent vested interests; 
most exist for sound reasons and most contribute to our high gen­
eral standard of housing. Codes are a very good example. From 
the mid-sixties on, pressure mounted for building code reform.
Many felt it was the restrictive nature of outmoded codes that kept 
us from producing true low cost housing. Code reform was under­
taken, still continues and is an important step in the modernization 
of the housing industry. But, sober reflection tells us that the 
effect on first cost will be slight, for codes deal mainly with the 
physical structure, which in turn is probably only a third of the 
cost of the house. And, since it has not been the history of building 
codes to lower any given standard, it must be assumed that standards, 
hence costs, will gradually increase—even with code reform.
For the consumer, housing has a qualitative and quantitative 
context. The qualitative aspects were made quite clear in the 
report of the President’s Committee on Urban Housing (the Kaiser 
Committee). Subsequent studies and Congressional action have 
confirmed their work, and though we need not linger on the well- 
known, it is valuable to reflect upon some of what that committee 
found. In order to provide enough standard housing for the entire 
population by 1978, the nation wiU need to build 13.4 million dwel­
ling units for the new young families formed in the decade ahead, 
and replace or rehabilitate 8.7 million units that are expected to 
deteriorate into substandard condition, and replace 3 million units 
that will be accidentally or intentionaUy destroyed, and build 1.6 
million units to create the proper proportion of vacancies for an 
increasingly mobile population. The total: a staggering 26.7 
million units.
The problem is compounded, however, by the qualitative nature 
of housing, especially for the 7.8 million house-poor families.
Unlike those in the normal housing market, they haven’t the dollars 
to pay for their needs and preferences, which are both unique and 
varied. They must have that possibility for their own satisfaction 
and for the creation of an adequate and flexible housing stock.
Housing, along with food, clothing, transportation, and med­
ical care, is a basic human requirement. It also has complex 
personal, social, economic, and political implications, not the 
least of which are connotations of property and symbolic standing 
within the community. At its most basic level, housing must be 
evaluated as to how adequately it shelters its inhabitants from 
threats in their environments—from situations that are physically 
or emotionally damaging. The house must serve as a refuge within 
which the individual can refuel the energies and sense of security 
that he needs to function in the outside world.
House-poor families generally range from the lower class 
through traditional working class to lower middle class; people 
with different motivations and needs. In such a mix, expectations, 
housing, and environment wiU vary widely. The lower middle 
class, for example, is characterized by an increasing prosperity 
that has given them an expanding outlook toward housing. There 
is a great desire to own one’s home rather than enrich a landlord. 
Along with the house and yard goes an elaboration of the house
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interior in a manner that creates a pleasant and cozy image closely 
approximating the standard of All-American affluence.
At the other extreme, for the lower class the primary criterion 
for housing is that it provide shelter from physical and psychological 
threats, both inside and outside the home. Lee Rainwater notes 
that a “ home to which one could retreat from such an insecure 
world would be of great value, but for lower class people such a 
home is not easy to come by. In part, this is due to the fact that 
one’s own family members themselves often make trouble or bring 
it in the home, but even more important, it is because it seems 
very difficult to create a home and an immediate environment that 
actually does shut out danger. ”  (2)
Woven through this spectrum of housing expectations are dif­
ferent views of family size, child rearing practices, privacy, and 
intangibles such as “ soul”  and “ taste. ”  Certainly housing is an 
integral part of a family’s social and psychological well-being. It 
is more than just something to keep out the elements. In contrast, 
federal housing programs for those of low and moderate income 
have generally assumed a middle class view which is applied so 
that the results are only a shadow of anything that the middle class 
would even look at.
It is apparent then that the societal context and implications of 
housing are such that mere shelter is not acceptable. It is equally 
apparent that current housing practice makes anything more than 
mere shelter, no matter what the technology, impossible to pro­
vide at a low first cost. However, this same society whose insti­
tutions have made housing for the low income family impossible, 
has also committed itself to compensating for those inadequacies 
that is has created in the housing market. It would, therefore, 
seem important to examine the housing costs in the larger context 
of this society.
Where do the costs of housing accumulate over its life: what 
are the actual costs, how are they paid and by whom. Figure 1 
represents the average estimated cost for a $24,000.00 FHA fi­
nanced home. It is limited to the costs directly attributable to the 
unit itself with only peripheral indication of larger costs.
Because filtering of housing is not proportional to the rate of 
deterioration, there seems to be little hope of raising the rate of 
depreciation above the rate of quality decline. Partial responsi­
bility for this must be attributed to governmental and land planning 
policies that have attempted to strengthen, not depreciate, values.
(3) However, even in an affluent society, the high initial cost of 
housing and its role as a necessity naturally work against rapid 
decline in values. Unfortunately, relative decline, when trans­
lated into a price reduction, diminishes in the later stages of a 
structure’s life. This occurs because, at each lower value level, 
more families can afford to buy. Grigsby notes that, “ Assuming 
the dwelling unit is not converted or demolished before the end of 
its potential economic life, the entire depreciation curve is then 
an inverted S, or the mirror image of a growth curve. ”  (4) It 
also appears that the families most satisfied with their accommo­
dations, and thus most reluctant to move, tend to be those of higher 
incomes on whom the market depends for creating most of the sur­
plus supply that will filter down to families of lower earning power. 
Considering the foregoing in light of the pyramidal shape of housing 
values in which production near the top will be retarded by only a 
small absolute excess of units, it is apparent that the farther down 
the scale that new construction can be injected, the larger the 
excess absolutely needed to check further building, and the greater 
the ultimate effect at the bottom of the market.
That brings us back to producing a low cost house; something 
apparently beyond our reach. We are faced with a socially in­
equable situation. Society in some form must step in. In this 
country the federal government, working directly or through del­
egated agents, has assumed the major portion of this burden. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to say that this burden has been 
assumed easily or in any systematic manner. But, there are 
presently five major active federal subsidy programs aimed at 
relieving these market inequities: Section 235 homeownership 
housing, Section 236 rental housing, Rent supplements, Low rent 
public housing, Rural homeownership housing. These programs 
have been vigorously implemented over the past few years in par­
ticular (see fig. 2).
Finance and closing
Construction including profit & overhead 
Land
Collected first cost 
Monthly cost = $248.00 x 12 months = 
$2976.00 x 45 years = 















It has been clear for some time that it is impossible to produce 
an acceptable low cost house. Yet there has been a wide spread, 
albeit diminishing belief, that the house-poor were served, if only 
inefficiently, by the downward flow, or filtering of used housing 
units.
Filtering is generally considered to be the result of shifts in 
supply and demand, of excess vacancies, and the process by which 
some sections of the housing stock become vacated, occupied by 
lower income groups, abandoned, demonlished, or converted to 
another use. We can compare filtering in the housing market to 
the more obvious example of filtering in the case of automobiles.
A car is sold new and, despite the general inflation, it can gen­
erally be purchased a decade later for a mere fraction of its orig­
inal price, even if it is in the very best of condition. Many cars 
will have, in that period, declined all the way to junk value and 
passed out of the stock completely. A car will drop in value both 
absolutely and relative to the auto stock as a whole and, in the 
process, it becomes available to lower income groups. A house, 
however, may not filter relative to the housing inventory in the 
same direction as it filters relative to general prices. Housing 
can filter up or down. Further, since the rate of deterioration of 
a house is highly controllable and is much more a function of under­
lying demand factors rather than of time or weather, filtering must 
be associated with technological, site, and locational obsolescence 
as well. Deterioration may simply be the manifestation of the later 
factors.














This graph illustrates the recent and sharp 
boost in subsidized housing starts. The 
steep rises in 1970-72 figures reflect the 
increasing impact of the new federal subsidy 
program s for homeownership and rental 
assistance (Sections 235 and 236 of the 
National Housing A ct). The figures for  the 
years 1970-72 have been revised sharply 
upward since the first o f this year.
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Fig. 2.
Subsidized production of low and moderate income housing 
has increased to the point that it represented approximately one- 
fourth of national production in 1971 (see fig. 3). HUD estimates 
assisted starts increasing to 500, 800 in the current period and 
564,000 in FY 197 3. (5)
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Good; this is what many of us have been wanting for some 
time: a serious assault on the shortage of standard housing for 
those households unable to afford what the market offers.
Unfortunately, our long sought assault has created a situation 
that we had not envisioned. This situation gained general attention 
from the special investigation of “ abuses in federal low-and- 
moderate income housing programs” , conducted by the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency. Reading the case studies of 
this report is a discouraging saga of “ faulty plumbing, leaky base­
ments and roofs, cracked plaster, faulty or inadequate wiring, 
rotten wood in floors, staircases, ceilings, porches, lack of in­
sulation and faulty heating units. ”  This is corroborated by recent 
GAO findings that 25 percent of all newly built homes under the 
235 homeownership program had serious structural defects that 
should have been corrected before sale. The most serious abuses, 
however, seem to be associated with existing and rehabilitated 
houses. There, for example, the GAO found serious defects in 44 
percent of existing homes bought under subsidy programs.
The cost and waste of such abuses outrage us because they are 
highly visible. But less visible costs may be even greater. 235 
and 236 are financed by budget gimmickry with mortgage interest 
subsidies stretched over 30 and 40 years. This stretch-out made 
initial expenditures very small, and attractive when they were 
initiated. But what started as a token program in 1968 turns out 
to have enormous consequences in 1972. We are now visibly 
alarmed over runaway housing subsidy costs. In its goals report, 
the Administration said that “ for the three fiscal years 1970 to 
1972 (we) have already obligated the federal government to subsidy 
payments of perhaps $30 billion over the next 30 to 40 years. . .  By 
1978 present estimates suggest that the federal government will be 
paying out at least $7.5 billion in subsidies.. .Over the life of the 
mortgages this could amount to the staggering total of more than 
$200 billion. .. ”  (6)
This disastrous situation has further complications. Many 
are now claiming that F.H .A. is underwriting the collapse of large 
residential areas of our central cities. “ The agency’s programs 
designed to allow poor people to own their homes have been largely 
misused by corrupt real estate speculators who are buying and 
selling unsound houses in decaying urban neighborhoods to people 
who cannot afford to refurbish, or even maintain them. ”  (7) The 
result: abandonment of single-family dwellings and the attraction 
of drugs, crime and other social ills to what used to be stable ur­
ban communities on a scale that is decimating entire neighborhoods. 
The gravity of this problem is illustrated by the belief of many 
housing experts that the Federal Government is the largest owner 
of single-family dwellings in at least two major cities, Philadelphia 
and Detroit. The cost of repossessing the housing is staggering, 
$200 million in these two cities alone. In Detroit, HUD and GAO 
experts estimate that the Federal Government has lost about 
$10, 000 per house and would have to invest another $9,000 in each 
house to make it more liveable, and still there probably wouldn’t 
be any buyers.
LIFE CYCLE PERFORMANCE STANDARD
We need an entirely new housing policy, one based in a broad 
perspective that recognizes housing as part of a larger eco-system 
of social requirements and costs. This viewpoint necessitates a 
life cycle definition of housing requirements and costs to the in­
dividual and the larger society. For the unit itself this means an 
accounting of: first cost, cost of money, cost of use-denial, 
operation and maintenance, rehabilitation, conversion, demolition. 
Housing induced costs to the larger society are more difficult but 
include items in the categories of: public safety costs of deterio­
rated houses and neighborhoods, use-denial costs of capital in­
vested in housing, costs in fixed public utilities and facilities for 
given development patterns, costs in discarded fixed public utilities 
and facilities associated with abandoned homes and neighborhoods, 
economic activity generated by replacement of obsolete or sub­
standard dwellings. Additionally, there are many housing-related 
factors such as general environmental quality which are not easily 
given a dollar figure but still have deep economic implications.
With this comprehensive definition of life cycle building costs 
it becomes possible to begin to develop a more realistic housing
policy. Such information would allow one further innovation: hous­
ing policy developed to the level performance necessary to meet 
stated national housing goals. Past housing policies, in contrast, 
have relied too heavily on only hopes and expectations. Perfor­
mance standards establish how the elements of a structure must 
perform to meet certain requirements rather than prescribing an 
acceptable response to a particular situation. This definition 
would be retained in developing a new housing policy but it would 
be interpreted more broadly.
HUD presently is completing a performance specification,
Guide Criteria for the Design and Evaluation of Operation Break­
through, covering all dwelling types from single-family detached 
to multi-family highrise. This excellent document is chiefly con­
cerned with matters of health, safety and comfort. However, it 
could be expanded to include standards of maintenance, operational 
expense, longevity, permutability, disposability, e tc .; standards 
that would apply to each element of life cycle housing costs. Such 
a performance guide depends on more data than is presently avail­
able and would be impossible to list here. Yet, it is valuable to 
touch on the general nature of such a guide in order to illustrate 
the complexity of interrelationships it should resolve.
Criteria concerned with the maintenance and operation of a 
housing unit, permutability in relation to use or rehabilitation or 
demolition are essentially technical problems. They would, there­
fore, fit fairly comfortably into the format already established by 
the HUD document. Policy questions, however, are not strictly 
technical and are subject to complex interrelationships of market 
and non-market factors. These form the difficult areas of any 
comprehensive performance standard for housing.
A highly simplified look at housing stock replacement rates, 
for example, reveals this complexity. Replacement rate require­
ments are established by: 1) setting optimum economic life for 
units of a given quality-type; 2) balancing this against the outright 
loss of units to the housing stock for that quality-type; 3) all the 
forementioned factors are then integrated with the rate of consumer 
improvement demand. Consumer improvement demand is a pre­
diction of what the demand for housing improvements will be over 
a given time period, combined with what policymakers determine 
will most benefit the overall housing stock during that same period. 
Whether the housing stock should be replaced continuously over 
that period, or totally at one time, have wide ramifications and 
are questions that add further to the complexity of establishing 
such standards. Related policies establishing elements such as 
minimum space and quality standards are established in other 
parts of the performance criteria, but must be reflected in the 
replacement rate policy requirements. Finally such a guideline 
to replacement rates must have the flexibility and fine control to 
respond to local deviations from the National Standard.
All elements of the housing policy would be delineated by these 
specific standards of performance, and though the effects on the 
housing sector are not entirely clear, they would be many. It 
seems likely, for example, that there would be an increased em­
phasis on the modification of housing. This, in turn, would bring 
change in other components of the housing sector. Financial in­
stitutions might provide long term loans for re-modeling not gen­
erally available at present. Tenure patterns might lengthen, 
restricting the filtering that does exist. An entirely new industry 
of standard replacement components might emerge.
In almost all areas of such a guideline, the voice of the con­
sumer would be strengthened.
IMPLICATIONS
The contention here should be clear. There is a defacto limit, 
below which it is impossible to build housing in this society. That 
limit should be recognized, as should the fact that first costs are 
only a small part of the economic activity associated with a housing 
unit over its life. That in fact we should not limit our concern to 
first costs but should seek to rationalize lifetime costs. Society 
has committed itself to decent housing for all, including outright 
subsidy where necessary. It should therefore recognize the nature 
of its commitment, including the larger costs to itself and seek to 
optimize the whole even though initial costs for individual units 
might increase. Actually realizing this optimal condition depends
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on a workable, comprehensive policy that subjects the various 
components of the housing sector to uniform standards of perfor­
mance .
Such a comprehensive standard implies the active role of the 
Federal Government. But, there is a backlash growing against 
federal involvement in housing. Fortune magazine, for example, 
recently called for a return to reliance on the market with the 
federal government confining itself to “ providing broad incentives 
and refereeing conflicts between various groups of citizens. ”  (8)
But falling back on the market simply says that the problem is 
not within our grasp. We would lose a great foothold of valuable 
though costly experience and allow the largest component of our 
national investment to wander, thereby lessening our ability to 
manage the nation’s economic well-being. And still our housing 
problems would not disappear. Political pressure would inevitable 
grow again for immediate solutions, the pendulum would swing, 
and we would be back to a chaotic mixture of short-term cures.
For those of us involved in housing industrialization and sys­
tems, these are critically important issues. Industrialization 
depends on a predictable market; a comprehensive housing policy 
provides this. Conversely, a workable housing policy depends on 
uniform standards and predictable levels of performance from the 
individual units within the housing stock—concepts at the very heart 
of industrial production. Plainly, our housing problems cannot be 
solved without a comprehensive housing policy, and this will be 
difficult to implement without the long term commitment of true 
industrialization, commitment that utilizes industrial capabilities 
and resources to control planning, design, construction, operation,
maintenance, rehabilitation and final disposal of all units within 
the housing stock. Long term commitment will not be feasible or 
attractive until a method is devised to measure the social and 
economic long-term value of housing. Long term evaluation re­
quires performance criteria, both accurate and relevant, by which 
to measure.
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